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Religion in Our Public Schools: Has the Supreme 
Court's Treatment of Religion Made Government 
Intervention in Education Unconstitutional? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Supreme Court adjudication in the area of religion in public 
education has been inconsistent at best and a display of flagrant 
preference at worst. If the United States Supreme Court's First 
Amendment analysis of religion in the public schools is pushed to 
its logical conclusion, the curricula of public schools may well be 
outside the realm of government control altogether. In support of 
this thesis, this article examines the various definitions of 
"religion" and "secular," surveys U.S. Supreme Court cases 
showing the treatment and definition of religion, and shows that 
the "state" has violated the Establishment Clause by establishing 
religion in our public schools. In conclusion, this article contends 
that Constitutionally-bound government should no longer be 
actively engaged in educational curriculum decisions, and suggests 
some possible alternatives to current government control of 
education that can be implemented to allow an appropriate level 
of religious influence while upholding the Constitution and keeping 
education "free" and "public." 
II. DEFINITION OF RELIGION 
There are various definitions of religion which have been or 
could be used by the Supreme Court. In order to better 
understand First Amendment jurisprudence, it is important to lay 
out the Court's various, explicit and implicit, definitions of religion. 
Religion, in its narrowest sense, has been defined as an established 
sect. In a broader application, it is defined as any individually held 
world view. 
The narrowest definition of religion is belief in a 
transcendent being, a God: "an individual's vertical relationship to 
a higher order of being, ... to anything that may serve as an a 
priori source of human knowledge or foundation for the 
explanation of human experience."1 Thus stated, religion is a 
1. Paul J. Toscano, INVISIBLE RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: SECULARISM, 
NEUTRALITY, AND THE SUPREME COURT 31-40 (Horizon Publishers 1990). 
96 
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personal belief in a higher source and revelation from that source. 
A broader definition of religion is "religion as the 
immanent."2 This suggests the possibility of individual and 
community communion with the Transcendent. 
A. Religion as Philosophy 
An even broader definition is religion as philosophy.3 This 
allows for more than a vertical orientation (man looking to God) 
and looks to "the horizontal plane [man looking to man or the 
world] and that [which] touch[es] matters humanitarian and social: 
the ultimate practical and philosophical concerns about life, death, 
good, and evil."4 Philosophy addresses many of the same questions 
oflife, death, good, and evil that religion addresses. Often, people 
form their world views according to both philosophy and religion. 
[W]hen "religion" is expanded to include our fundamental 
concerns with our fellow beings and with our natural 
environment, then the distinction between philosophy and 
religion becomes too blurred to track. The concerns of each 
become so intertwined and interconnected that they cannot be 
disentangled. What is religion to one person is philosophy to 
another. Thus, no definition of religion can be devised that will 
not, depending upon one's point of view, potentially embrace 
some or all philosophical concerns. 5 
Both religion and traditional philosophy ask the 
quintessential questions: What is the good, what is the true, and 
what is the beautiful? The answers to such fundamental questions 
necessarily make value assumptions and judgments about life. 
B. Religion as a World View 
Religion as a world view broadens the definition beyond 
that of mere philosophy. A world view is a pattern or paradigm by 
which an individual creates "a scheme for understanding and 
explaining certain aspects ofreality."6 The definition of world view 
as religion can be expanded further to connote "any system of 
beliefs or assumptions [utilized] to see connections and 
2. ld. at 32. 
3. Id. at 32-34. 
4. Id. at 32. 
5. Id. at 32-33. 
6. Id. at 34. 
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relationships."7 
Connections and relationships can be based on mythical, 
mystical or traditional religious beliefs by looking to the 
transcendent; based on science, reason, or the scientific method by 
looking to mankind8; or, based on the world or the environment by 
looking to nature.9 The basis for connections and relationships 
indicates one's standard of measuring things and one's world view. 
The definition of religion as a world view is that an 
individual, through personal perception, interprets any value or 
any aspect of life. That interpretation is religious belief. 
III. DEFINITIONS OF RELIGION EMPLOYED BY THE SUPREME COURT 
Evidence suggests that the definition of religion employed 
by the Supreme Court has changed over time. What was intended 
by the Framers as the meaning of"religion" is markedly different 
than the Court's modern conception. 
Originally, "the Bill of Rights contained unprecedented 
provisions guaranteeing freedom of religious conscience and 
prohibiting the establishment of a national church."10 It seems 
clear from the historical evidence, that in the First Amendment, 
"an establishment of religion" meant the public and institutional 
manifestation of religion, while "free exercise" referred to private 
religion or the private right of conscience.11 Despite the Framers 
intended interpretation, the Court has strayed from those original 
narrow definitions, to various, looser, and perhaps even conflicting 
definitions. 
In the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting the First 
Amendment, there is a "conspicuous absence ... of any consistent, 
complete, and formal definition of the term 'religion."'12 "The 
United States Supreme Court's Religion Clause opinions are widely 
perceived to be hostile to religion."13 In fact, the "judiciary's 
7. Id. at 35. 
8. For an example of relationships based on looking at mankind, see John 
Dewey's A COMMON FAITH. 
9. Examples of connections and relationships based on the world, the 
environment, or nature can be seen in EMILE by Rousseau and NATURAL RELIGION by 
Hume. 
10. Frederick M. Gedicks, The Religions, the Secular, and the Antithetical, 20 
Cap. U. L. Rev. 113, 120 (1991). 
11. Toscano, supra note 1, at 64. 
12. Id. at 63. 
13. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 Va. L. Rev. 
671 (April 1992). See also Richard A. Baer, Perspectives on Religion and Education 
in American Law and Politics: The Supreme Court's Discriminatory Use of the Term 
"Sectarian", 6 J.L. & Pol. 449 (Spring 1990). 
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church-state principles do not resonate with the popular 
sentiments. They seem counterintuitive to the average citizen and 
the Court knows it."14 
IV. SECULARISM AS AN IDEOLOGY FALLS INTO THE DEFINITION OF 
RELIGION 
Secularism has been defined in terms of placement of 
political power. During the Medieval period, the spheres of 
"religious" and "secular" did not exist as descriptions of 
fundamentally different aspects of society. . . . There were two 
forces that encouraged the institutional separation of church and 
state into fundamentally different social spheres of the religious 
and the secular; one force was theological, the other political ... 
[T]he state was not understood to be nonreligious, but was simply 
a different aspect of the sovereign authority of God. 15 
The state and church were intertwined during this period, 
and there was no doubt that the secular and the religious worked 
together. Secular did not mean non-religious. 
To ensure that religious diversity would not be a stumbling 
block for the members of society in their associations with each 
other, the American colonists incorporated the Bill of Rights. With 
the First Amendment, '"Secular' gradually came to be associated 
with 'religiously neutral."'16 Politicians, among others, employed 
overtly sectarian language in their politicking; although, through 
14. !d. at 671 n.3, citing Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the 
Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of Itself, 37 Case W. Res. 
L. Rev. 674, 739 (1987); See also several law journal articles that have been written 
on the subject of the lack of a definition of religion and suggesting possible definitions 
to the Supreme Court. Anand Agneshwar, Note, Rediscovering God in the 
Constitution, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 593 (1992); Andrew W. Austin, Faith and the 
Constitutional Definition of Religion, 22 Cumb. L. Rev. 1 (1991/1992); Richard 0. 
Frame, Note, Belief in a Nonmaterial Reality--A Proposed First Amendment Definition 
of Religion, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 819. As anecdotal evidence, many articles have been 
written about the influence of secularism as a religion in public schools, but none have 
been cited in any way by the Supreme Court in dealing with these issues when they 
arise. A few examples are: Mary Harter Mitchell, Secularism in Public Education: 
The Constitutional Issues, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 603 (July 1987); Peter D. Schmid, Comment, 
Religion, Secular Humanism and the First Amendment, 13 S. Ill. U. L.J. 357 (Winter 
1989); Craig A. Mason, Comment, 'Secular Humanism' and the Definition of Religion: 
Extending a Modified 'Ultimate Concern' Test to Mozert v. Hawkins County Public 
Schools and Smith v. Board of School Commissioners, 63 Wash. L. Rev. 445 (April 
1988); Michael R. O'Neill, Comment, Government's Denigration of Religion: Is God the 
Victim of Discrimination in Our Public Schools?, 21 Pepp. L. Rev. 477 (1994); George 
W. Dent, Jr., Religious, Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 863 (May 1988). 
15. Gedicks, supra note 10, at 116-117. 
16. Id. at 120. 
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the 1800's, general religious language became more acceptable and 
even encouraged. However, the divergence of the religious and 
secular was furthered and religious language gradually 
disappeared from the area of public discourse by the 1930s.17 
"Sectarian discourse became increasingly confined to 
private life, and ultimately survived in public life only as 'civil 
religion' - faintly Protestant platitudes which reaffirmed the 
religious base of American culture despite being largely void of 
theological significance."18 In the 20th century, the full separation 
between the secular and the religious was completed. Some 
considered "civil religion" a violation of the First Amendment; 
consequently, the sectarian and secular were severed. 
Secularism favors science and the scientific method for 
gaining knowledge; its way of knowing is empirical. If a thing 
cannot be proven by the scientific method, it is not knowable. This 
perspective eliminates the possibility of the Creation or absolute 
moral values since there is no way to prove what "good" is. In fact, 
science secularized the personal questions of life. The question: 
"What is my purpose?" became "How does nature work?" The 
question: "Why am I here?'' became "How can we control it?" The 
question: "What should I know?" became "How does the mind 
work?" The question: "Why should I know this?" became "How can 
we control behavior?" The question: "What should I do?" became 
"What do people do?" Finally, the question: "Why should we do 
this?" became "How can we control society?"19 
Secular questions are variations of traditionally religious 
questions, merely asked from a different viewpoint, asserting a 
certain way of knowing and relating to the world. 
Secularists, including Secular Humanists, have defined 
their ideals in three documents. These ideals are summarized in 
three documents, the "Humanist Manifesto 1," the "Humanist 
Manifesto II," and "A Secular Humanist Declaration."20 These 
documents outline a secularist creed which defines their anti-
theistic beliefs as religion, ethics as relativistic and based on man, 
17. ld. at 120-121. 
18. Id. at 122. 
19. A. LeGrand Richards, The Secularization of the Academic World-View: The 
History of a Process and its Consequences for the Study of Education 313 
(1982)(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brigham Young University) The religious 
questions of "what is" and "why should" were replaced with the secular questions of 
"how does" and "how can." Natural science became the secular substitute of 
metaphysics. Psychology became the secular substitute of epistemology. Sociology, 
anthropology, and political science became the secular substitute of ethics. 
20. B. Douglas Hayes, Note, Secular Humanism in Public Schools: Thou Shalt 
Have No Other God (Except Thyself), 63 Notre Dame L. Rev. 358, 365 (1988). 
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the individual as paramount, democratic society with civil liberties 
as supreme, and a world community based upon transnational 
government. 21 
V. SUPREME COURT DEFINITION OF RELIGION INCLUDES 
SECULARISM 
An examination of the concepts "secular," "secularism," and 
"Secular Humanism" in light of the Supreme Court's definition of 
"religion" reveals that these concepts are religious and define a 
religion. 
Rather than accept the Court's interpretation of its own 
decisions, it proves enlightening to look at the practical results of 
Supreme Court decisions in this area. The following analyzes, 
compares, and examines (1) various Supreme Court interpretations 
ofthe term "religion" as found in the public education context, (2) 
the Supreme Court definition to the general definitions of religion 
explored above in part II and, (3) the implications of that 
comparison against the Court's constitutional tests. This analysis 
defines "religion" as derived from the actual, practical effect that 
each decision has had. 
Real changes in the definition of religion in education cases 
are exemplified in such cases as Everson u. Board of Education22•23 
Here, the Court says that the "establishment of religion" means at 
least this: 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. 
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or 
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence 
a person to go to or remain away from church against his will or 
force him to profess a belief in any religion. No person can be 
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or 
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in 
any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious 
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or 
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. 
21. !d. at 365-366 (quoting the "Humanist Manifesto II"): 
1. Religion: Religions which place God above humans do a 
disservice. "We find insufficient evidence for belief in the existence 
of a supernatural: it is either meaningless or irrelevant to the 
question of the survival and fulfillment of the human race. As 
nontheists, we begin with humans not God, nature not deity." 
Teachings of eternal salvation or damnation are "illusory and 
harmful" because they "distract humans from present concerns." 
22. Everson v. Bd. ofEduc. of Ewing TP., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
23. Toscano, supra note 1, at 66. 
102 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [1996 
Neither a state nor the Federal Govemment can, openly or 
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations 
or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause 
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a 
wall of separation between Church and State."24 
However, the terms "participation in the affairs of any religious 
organization," "support" of religious activities, and "wall of 
separation" were not defined by the Court. 
Everson held Maryland residents were not required to take 
an oath affirming a belief in God in order to become a public 
official. 
In Engle u. Vitale,25 the Supreme Court declared a 
mandatory nondenominational prayer for New York public school 
students unconstitutional and a violation of the First Amendment. 
The prayer read: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence 
upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our 
teachers, and our Country."26 The Court was correct in ruling that 
the prayer forced public school students to exercise religion, but 
stretched in suggesting that such a prayer established religion. 
The Court's ruling implied that the definition of religion is broader 
than an "institutionally established church or sect," and is at least 
as broad as "common belief." The impetus behind the prayer most 
likely was a group of legislators in New York who shared a 
significantly common belief to have passed the prayer into a 
prescriptive, mandatory law. The Court implies that those 
legislators who voted to have the prayer organized established a 
religion. 
In Abington u. Schemp,27 the Court prohibited all Bible 
reading in public school, even though the reading was done without 
interpretation or comment. Here, content was judged to be 
inherently religious. The Court most likely reasoned that many 
ideas were put forth by the Bible, and innumerable religions based 
on its contents. However, banning Bible reading for its content, 
without interpretation, defined religion beyond the institutional 
church, beyond a profession of deity, and indicates that the Court 
defines religion as the expression of any idea or world view. 
In general, literature embraces ideas and world views, 
including philosophy, history, social studies, or anthropology. 
Teaching goes beyond the survey of these areas. By this definition, 
24. Everson, at 15-16. 
25. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422 (1962). 
26. Toscano, supra note 1, at 86, citing Engle v. Vitale, ld. 
27. Abington v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
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literature would be considered religion. Yet, interpretations of 
knowledge in these subjects are taught, tested, and graded, which 
seems inconsistent with traditional concepts of religion. 
Epperson v. Arkansas28 dealt with an Arkansas law that 
attempted to ban teaching evolution yet, endorsed teaching 
Creation. The Court banned teaching the Creation and eliminated 
the prohibition on teaching evolution. The Court offended the 
First Amendment by accepting one world view as the only valid 
one in the marketplace of ideas, that the biblical creation world 
view was inferior, and that evolution was the preferred world view 
or interpretation of the origins ofman.29 
Lemon v. Kurtzman 30 arose when Rhode Island and 
Pennsylvania statutes allocated public monies to non-public 
schools to help provide materials. The court held that the statutes 
gave rise to excessive entanglement between church and state. 
The Court established a three-part test for statutes and school 
policies, which the opinion claimed was the result of a survey of the 
Court's decisions of the past. The Court held: 
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the 
cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years. 
Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the 
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its 
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive 
government entanglement with religion (citations omitted)."31 
Criticism of this decision is voluminous; even individual 
members of the Supreme Court criticized and "snubbed" the Lemon 
test. For example, in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village 
School District v. Grumet,32 Justice Scalia's dissent notes that, 
"Finally, Justice O'Connor observes [in her dissent] that the 
Court's opinion does not focus on the so-called Lemon test, [citation 
omitted], and she urges that that test be abandoned, at least as a 
"unitary approach" to all Establishment Clause claims." Justice 
Scalia further stated he has already "documented the Court's 
convenient relationship with Lemon, which it cites only when 
28. 393 u.s. 97 (1968). 
29. Id. 
30. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
31. Id. at 612-613. 
32. Bd. ofEduc. ofKiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S.Ct. 2481 (1994) 
(5-3 decision) (Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court; Blackmun, J., concurring; 
Stevens, J., concurring, Blackmun, J. and Ginsburg, J. joining; O'Connor, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment; Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment; 
Scalia, J., dissenting, Rehnquist, C.J. and Thomas., J. joining). 
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useful. " He also declared that the Court snubbed Lemon by 
acknowledging Lemon with only two "see also" citations, saying, 
"The Court's decision today is astounding."33 
It is important to note precisely what the three parts of this 
test required. The first prong states there must be "a secular 
legislative purpose."34 While this prong is unclear, it indicates a 
favoritism for the secular world view. 
The second prong lays out a neutrality element,35 which 
states that a statute "must be one that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion."36 The second prong is a direct contradiction to 
the first prong, for in the first prong the Court emphasized a need 
for "a secular legislative purpose." The secular world view 
maintains a privileged position under the guise of "false 
neutrality."37 
The third prong prohibits "excessive government 
entanglement with religion." Here again, the questions of: (1) 
what is religion and (2) what constitutes excessive government 
entanglement, must be asked. Prior Supreme Court decisions 
point to religion as the holding of a world view; the government, 
therefore, under it's own third prong of the Lemon test, is already 
heavily entangled with public schools, which subscribe to and 
promote the secular world view. The implications of excessive 
government entanglement remains unclear, but Lemon and later 
Court decisions try to set those boundaries. 
Lemon determined that excessive federal government 
entanglement was the cause behind state governments enactment 
of legislation allowing public school funds to subsidize private 
school teacher's salaries to the extent that they taught secular 
subjects. Most private schools in these states were parochial and 
the Court held that "the very restrictions and surveillance 
necessary to ensure that teachers play a strictly nonideological role 
give rise to entanglements between church and state."38 The Court 
also made an issue of the fact that this would give rise to people 
using religion in politics and voting according to their faith, 39 but 
33. Id. 
34. Lemon, at 612. 
35. See David G. Leitch, Note, The Myth of Religious Neutrality by Separation in 
Education, 71 Va. L. Rev. 127 (Feb. 1985). 
36. Lemon, at 612. 
37. Toscano, supra note 1, at 15-17, 76-83 (discussing the illusion of neutral 
education and ideological neutrality and the commitment of the Court to a false 
neutrality). 
38. Lemon at 620-621. 
39. Id. at 622. 
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this point is arguably without merit.40 There is nothing 
unconstitutional or improper with individuals holding personal 
world views and acting and influencing society according to those 
personal world views, such as in voting. 
Another problem presented by this third prong is that the 
Court itself is guilty of "excessive government entanglement with 
religion. "41 
Where the national government was originally committed to 
keeping its hands off institutional and personal religion, it is now 
committed, by the United States Supreme Court, to a policy of 
continual interference in the form of case-by-case line drawing, as 
the courts attempt to determine which activities of government 
amount to a religious preference and which to religious 
interference. Thus, the Supreme Court has turned the historical 
non-interventionist stance into a continuing intervention stance 
by giving to the religion clauses an interpretation that is 
repugnant to the intent of those who originally framed the 
amendment's language to protect all religions from government 
intrusion.42 
Other cases deal with line-drawing of what "excessive 
governmental entanglement" is or is not.43 
The Court extends the secular-purpose prong in Stone v. 
Graham,44 ruling that the Ten Commandments could not be posted 
in a public school, even though the secular purpose was to promote 
the commonly held civic values that the Ten Commandments 
contain.45 The Court imposed a presumption of sectarian intent 
where none should have been imposed, striking out against the 
possibility of promoting the Judea-Christian world view by 
happenstance. 
The Supreme Court vaguely referred to its previous 
conception of religion. In Torcaso v. Watkins, 46 the Court discussed 
"religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those 
40. See Stephen L. Carter, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND 
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (Bantam 1993). 
41. Lemon, at 622. 
42. Id. 
43. See Toscano, supra note 1, at 93-94 for discussion of the following cases. 
Aguilar v. Fenton, 473 US. 402 (1985) (Court invalidates program using federal funds 
to pay public employees to give remedial instruction and guidance to non-public 
students on premises of church owned schools); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 
(1988) (funding given to religious approaches of solving teenage pregnancy problem). 
44. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). 
45. Toscano, supra note 1, at 91. 
46. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
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religions founded on different beliefs."47 The Court then listed 
some belief systems in the United States "which do not teach what 
would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God [such 
as] Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and 
others (citations omitted)."48 This dictum indicates the Court's 
definition of religion encompasses at least as far as "religion as 
philosophy" because some of the above "isms," such as Secular 
Humanism, are considered by many to be philosophies, not 
religion. 
An interesting turn in First Amendment jurisprudence is 
found in Lynch v. Donnelly.49 Here the court adopted religious 
"accommodation" by finding constitutional a publicly purchased 
and displayed creche, and by retreating from the "wall of 
separation" doctrine.50 
From these various decisions and their effects, one gleans 
the meanings given to religion by the U.S. Supreme Court. In 
Abington v. Schemp, we learned that the reading of a text which 
espoused a world view, in this case the Bible, even without 
interpretation, was a violation of the First Amendment. Torcaso 
indicated that a religion need not be theistic in order to be a 
religion. This is important in the analysis, for then the other 
Supreme Court religion tests can be applied no matter the basis of 
a given world view. The reasoning in Engle is evidence that the 
Court could consider that a non-denominational, theistic prayer 
established a religion. It is easy to see how such a fixed, short 
prayer could be seen as a catechism, which is how the recitation of 
facts or answers to a test could be seen. Stone showed disfavor for 
a certain way of expressing commonly held values, while the 
Epperson ruling suggested a preference for science law. 
VI. PUBLIC EDUCATION HAs ADOPTED SECULARISM AS ITS 
FOUNDATION 
Public education has adopted secularism, specifically 
Secular Humanism, as its underlying foundation. Professor A. 
LeGrand Richards51 points out that an important aspect of proving 
the secular trend in education resulted from American schools of 
educational philosophy trading in their ideological/philosophical 
47. Id. at 495. 
48. Id. at 495 n.ll. 
49. 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
50. Toscano, supra note 1, at 92. 
51. Professor in the College of Education, Brigham Young University. 
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roots for roots in science. 52 By the 1930s, the transition from the 
education/philosophical approach to education to the 
scientific/instructional science approach to education was 
complete.53 No longer did the American educational establishment 
search the American soul and ask the crucial questions of what 
should be taught in American schools. Rather, it turned from 
those questions and focused "philosophy of education" on how to 
teach whatever is taught more efficiently and with better results. 
The focus turned to methods instead to basic questions of why. 
"What" became the methods of "how"; striving for better 
methodology and scientific advancement became the "why." 
Any coherent approach to education must answer either 
explicitly, or by implication, at least three fundamental questions: 
What is man? What should he be? and How should we help him 
become what he should be?54 
Richards goes on to suggest that a Christian concept of man is an 
appropriate world view for the educational environment, 55 and as 
such need not be excluded from the discussion of educational 
theory and practice. If this approach is correct, then any answers 
must be religious, for an answer to the question "Who is man?" 
must necessarily dictate an ideology or an approach to knowing the 
world. This example shows that, though the world view promoted 
would change from secularism to Christianity, there must be some 
world view foundation for education. If a world view is religion, 
and schools must promote a world view in order to teach, and 
schools are sponsored by government, then schools are teaching 
religion, which is unconstitutional under the tests the Supreme 
Court has promulgated. 
Because of the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
"establishment" as ideological rather than institutional, 56 the Court 
has constitutionally pushed government outside the schooling 
business without explicitly admitting it. By evaluating these cases 
in this way, the Court has shown that government should leave the 
schooling business or be guilty of establishing a state 
52. Interview with A. LeGrand Richards, Assistant Professor of Education at 
Brigham Young University (Jan. 12, 1995). 
53. Id. 
54. Richards, supra note 197, at 300; see also A. LeGrand Richards, Technology, 
Democracy and the American Dream in Education, Rassegna Di Pedagogia (1992); A. 
LeGrand Richards, Padagogik vs. Pedagogy: The Technological Seduction of American 
Educational Theory, Proceedings of Far West. Phil. ofEduc. Soc'y. (1989). 
55. ld. 
56. Toscano, supra note 1, at 64. 
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ideology/religion. 
VII. DUE TO THE INHERENT PROMOTION OF AN IDEOLOGY IN 
EDUCATION AND VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT, THE 
SUPREME COURT SHOULD RULE THAT GOVERNMENT WITHDRAW 
ITSELF FROM CURRICULUM DECISIONS IN PARTICULAR AND 
ENTANGLING INVOLVEMENT IN GENERAL 
Under Supreme Court rulings, the government should 
exclude itselffrom dictating the interpretations and values taught 
in school. If not even a "civil religion" is allowed as permissible 
religion, then the teaching process itself falls outside the oversight 
of the government because the teaching process involves values 
and world views on how, what, and why students should be 
taught. 57 
Compulsory education requirements are evidence of the 
57. Many questions arise in the ideological context. Toscano asks the following 
series of questions: 
Should strongly held beliefs, especially with regard to education and 
curriculum, go unexpressed simply because the majority feels that such 
beliefs are religious? If so, how can religious ideas be avoided in American 
education? And, if they are avoided, what kind of public education will 
result? Should the historical Reformation be taught solely as a political, 
social, and economic movement without any mention of its religious basis or 
theological origin? And, if the theological questions are raised at all, how 
should they be treated? As meaningless? Irrelevant? Or superstitious? 
Can a religious question ever be treated in the public schools as a serious 
question upon which reasonable individuals could differ? Can racial equality 
be taught without invoking a moral value and without explaining its religious 
source? Can any religion or ideology survive after two generations of school 
children have effectively been insulated from it? Is there any hope for a 
society dedicated to peace and to justice if its religious underpinnings are 
removed from future generations? 
"How far away from the Judea-Christian tradition must America move to 
make sure that it is not establishing as religion or effectuating as public 
policy a viewpoint that is ultimately traceable to the Judea-Christian 
tradition?" [citation omitted]. How many issues must be removed from the 
democratic arena because they are religiously motivated? Should, for 
example, our senators and representatives disqualify themselves from voting 
in the halls of our legislatures simply because their views are born of 
religious, as opposed to secular, convictions? Is the state prohibited from 
imparting or from allowing churches or parents to impart to a child in public 
school anything "that might influence his ultimate concerns and paramount 
beliefs?" [citation omitted]. How can any subject matter be religiously neutral 
when it is offensive to a person's religious convictions? 
Toscano, supra note 1, at 82. 
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government's interest in an educated populace. In light of this 
interest, the Supreme Court has three alternatives to dealing with 
religion in American schools. The first option is to maintain the 
views previously expressed, becoming more entangled in 
curriculum content, thereby defining the state ideology. 
Another option the Supreme Court may follow is to back off 
its stance toward religion and allow states broader latitude to 
enact statutes similar to those previously adjudged 
unconstitutional by the Court. This option is repugnant to many 
and would require even more litigation to re-define where the 
limits of values and ideology cross too far into the establishment 
of religion in public schools. 
The third option is for the Supreme Court to remove itself 
entirely from involving the Court and government in educational 
issues that deal with values and ideology. This non-interference 
stance would perhaps require government to relinquish its direct 
sponsorship of education to a light regulatory, but non-curricular 
role over schools. 
Whatever the case may be, the Court has found itself, as a 
government entity, entangled with religion by adjudicating too 
many cases involving religion. These problems indicate that the 
Court should step back and recognize, as it did in creating the Erie 
Doctrine, that it has extended itself into an area, inappropriate for 
Supreme Court venturing. In education, it is inappropriate for the 
Court and government to dictate an ideology since the Court itself 
has for practical purposes defined an ideology as religion. 
In Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 58 the Supreme Court overruled 
the common practice in the federal district courts of disregarding 
state law to decide state cases and creating and applying a "federal 
common law." This practice was based on the doctrine of Swift v. 
Tyson. 59 The Erie decision held: "There is no federal general 
common law."60 The Court quoted Mr. Justice Holmes who 
described the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson as "an unconstitutional 
assumption of powers by courts of the United States which no 
lapse of time or respectable array of opinion should make us 
hesitate to correct."61 
Just as the Court acknowledged that the federal courts' 
application of federal general common law was erroneous, they 
should now acknowledge that their own "unconstitutional 
58. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
59. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
60. Erie, at 78. 
61. Erie, at 79 (quoting Swift v. Tyson). 
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assumption of powers" and entanglement of First Amendment 
jurisprudence is likewise erroneous. 
VIII. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS THAT ARE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STILL 
ALLOW A "FREE, PuBLIC EDUCATION" ARE VOUCHERS, TAX 
CREDITS, OR EQUAL TIME STATUTES THAT THE SUPREME COURT 
WILL LIKELY NOT STRIKE DOWN 
Two possible solutions to this dilemma of excessive 
government entanglement with religion are (1) promote greater 
privatization of schools through tax credits, vouchers or state 
charter schools, or (2) avoid striking down equal time statutes 
contained in many local school board statutes. The problems that 
must be overcome involve the fact that many state constitutions 
require a compulsory education that be both "free" and "public." 
Both Carter and Toscano suggest that vouchers or tax 
credits are constitutional approaches that would allow citizens to 
choose a school that coincides with their "religion."62 Simply 
speaking, vouchers and tax credits both allow parents to allocate 
money collected for educational purposes to any school of the 
parents' choice, whether private or public. By allowing parents to 
send their children to their school of choice, the Court and the 
government avoid promoting any "religion." Thus meeting the 
requirements of a "free" and "public" education, while keeping 
religious influence to a minimum. 
State charter schools are schools where groups of citizens 
can organize their own school with state monies, make their own 
decisions as to hiring of teachers and curriculum, and receive 
funding according to how many children attend the school. 
There is a legitimate concern that either system of tax 
credits/vouchers or charter schools may still entangle the Court far 
too extensively by allowing tax money collected by the government 
to go toward private religious schools. One way to deal with this 
problem is that the government could cut back its involvement in 
the educational establishment to the extent that it is not 
considered the supporter of any particular school. 
This could be done in the same manner that Congress has 
chartered federal mortgage companies. The Federal National 
Mortgage Association (FNMA) is a federally-sponsored private 
corporation which is not considered to be a direct government 
entity. In court cases where the FNMA has been challenged for 
violation of insufficient notice, the courts have held that for 
62. Carter, supra note 40, at 192-194, 200; Toscano, supra note 1, at 126. 
96] RELIGION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 111 
constitutional purposes these federally chartered mortgage 
companies' actions are not sufficient state action to be bound by 
the Due Process, notice, and hearing provisions of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.63 
School districts could be chartered by state governments 
while still avoiding government regulation held to the strict 
standards of the First, Fifth, or Fourteenth Amendments. This 
would require a quasi- or full privatization of public education, 
sufficient to allow local school districts to follow the wishes of their 
patrons. This may seem to be a legal fiction, but it is no more a 
legal fiction than the supposed ideological neutrality in public 
schools' curriculum today. 
Many voice concerns about the effect of privatization on the 
quality of education. One possible way to address this concern is 
to insure that general knowledge is being taught to meet the 
educational requirements of the state, perhaps through 
standardized tests, such as are already in place, and could be the 
criteria by which schools are granted certification by the state. 
Some might argue the solution is to allow equal time to all 
views of the world.64 This would be an unacceptable and 
impossible task because there would be no realistic way to 
incorporate all world views - at least one would be objectionable to 
some school patron. This option also assumes that all world views 
are known and thus could be taught. Not insignificantly, this 
approach would also lead to more court intervention and 
entanglement. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The definitions of religion used by the Court today are 
easily broad enough to include all notions of values and world 
views. The definition of secular today means that world view 
which accepts only "objective" and "empirical" ways of knowing the 
world and eschews religion. Applying these definitions to the 
63. GrantS. Nelson and Dale A. Whitman, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAw,§ 7.27, n.2 
(1993)(Footnote 2 gives a large list of cases supporting this result under the 
Fourteenth Amendment); § 7.28 (Explains no sufficient state action for Fifth 
Amendment purposes where the government acts contractually)(See Warren v. Gov't 
Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 611 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir.), cert. den. 449 U.S. 847 (1980)(GNMA 
not considered the federal government for Fifth Amendment purposes because, 
according to Nelson and Whitman, "the court was suggesting that even the United 
States can act in a proprietary or commercial, as opposed to governmental, fashion . 
. . " The suggestion here is that government involvement in public education be 
considered proprietary and not governmental action). 
64. See Toscano, supra note 1, at 124. 
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practical effects of Supreme Court decisions shows that no 
ideology, not even secularism, may be promoted by government, 
and not even in the public schools. Since no true education can 
occur without a view of the world by which to transmit or teach 
values or interpretations of knowledge, all teaching must 
inherently be religious. Secularism as a world view has been 
adopted by the educational establishment and the Supreme Court. 
Thus, the Court by its definition of religion has put educational 
curriculum outside the Court's and government's constitutional 
control by declaring that any delivery of religious teaching with 
public monies is unconstitutional.65 
Paul Waldron 
65. See Everson, at 15. ("No tax in any amount ... can be levied to support any 
religious activities ... whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.") 
